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Why Is Betamax an Anachronism
in the Digital Age?
Erosion of the Sony Doctrine and Indirect Copyright
Liability of Internet Technologies
By Jiarui Liu*
6
The copyright bar widely recognizes later proved the wisdom of such holdings.
Twenty years later, confronted with
Universal City Studios v. Sony Corporation of
another
edge-cutting information technology
America ("Sony") as a landmark of indirect
featuring
digitalization and the Internet, copycopyright liability.2 When copyright holders
right holders once again resort to an indirect
cried doom for the advent of a new commuof liability against technolnications technology, namely the Betamax copyright theory
7 such as those operating elecogy
providers,
Video Tape Recorder ("VTR"), the Supreme
Court decided to preserve the delicate balance tronic bulletin board systems9 ("BBS") or peerbetween important competing interests: the to-peer file sharing systems. Accordingly, the
need to retain incentives to intellectual cre- Sony case unsurprisingly has become one of
ation in works of authorship and the desire to the most frequently quoted cases by courts
enhance technological innovation in other ar- of Internet-related copyright cases. However,
eas of commerce. On the
"Although the entertainment
one hand, the
industry now appears to regard
Court
held
that the abpeer-to-peer file sharing as
sence of any
unprecedented and outrageous
explicit language in the
piracy, it must have had no less a
Copyright Act
did not prestrong feeling toward Betamax
clude the posVTRs twenty years ago."
sibility of indirect copyright
liability.3 On the other hand, by analogizing
the "staple article of commerce" theory in the it appears that the essence of the Sony docPatent Act,4 it refrained from imposing indi- trine appears is not followed faithfully all of
rect copyright liability on providers of copy- the time. Some lower courts have conjured
ing technologies that may be used to infringe various formulas to narrow, or even preclude,
copyright on the grounds that the technology the application of the Sony doctrine, includis also capable of substantial noninfringing ing the dichotomies of contributory infringeuses. 5 A prosperous home entertainment ment versus vicarious liability, products vermarket, from which both copyright holders sus services, and actual knowledge versus conand VTR manufacturers greatly benefited, structive knowledge.
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This Article aims to examine whether,
as some courts indicate, the Sony doctrine is
largely irrelevant in cyberspace. If the answer
is no, how should courts properly apply the
Sony doctrine to protect copyright holders' legitimate interests and further the innovation
and prosperity of Internet technologies? This
Article argues that the Sony doctrine should be
given the widest application possible and not
be subject to any preconceived formula. In the
digital age, the test of "capable of substantial
noninfringing uses" is still well suited to advance
the ultimate objective of copyright law contemplated by the Supreme Court as well as by the
Constitution: "promot[ing]
the Progress of Sci10
ence and useful Arts."
Section I begins with a historic brief of
the Sony case, the real image of which might
have been blurred by fragmentary or even
manipulative quotations in numerous subsequent cases. Section II analyzes some lower
courts' readings of the Sony doctrine, elucidates
their misapplication of the doctrine, and proposes a better application. Section III discusses
the relevance of the Sony doctrine in the digital
age and argues that it should remain one of the
most favorable and forceful safeguards for the
general public's interests in technology innovation and free flow of information. Section IV
summarizes the main points of this Article and
presents several policy recommendations.

I.

Revisiting the Sony Legacy

businesses.12 Jack Valenti, the president of
Motion Pictures Association, alleged that "the
VTR is to the American film producer and the
American public as the Boston Strangler is to
13
the woman alone."'
Consequently, Universal and Walt
Disney, the copyright holders of works in certain television programs, did not wait long to
sue Sony, the manufacturer of Betamax VTRs,
based on contributory infringement and vicarious liability theories, claiming that Sony sold
products which enabled consumers to infringe
the plaintiffs' copyrights.14 The District Court
for the Central District of California denied any
of the relief that the plaintiffs sought. It held
that most consumers used VTRs for the purpose of time-shifting,' 5 which was a fair use under the copyright law. 6 Furthermore, the District Court held that Sony could not be held
contributorily and vicariously liable for copyright infringement even if the home use of a
VTR was considered an infringing use. It reasoned that imposing liability on staple articles
of commerce that have substantial
noninfringing uses went beyond precedent and
arguably judicial management. 7
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit entirely reversed and remanded
the case to the District Court to determine relief. The Court of Appeals held that consumers' home recordings did not constitute fair
use.18 It also rejected the argument about the
exemption for staple articles of commerce. 9
Since Betamax VTRs were manufactured, advertised, and sold for the primary purpose of
reproducing television programming, and virtually all such programming was copyrighted
material, the Court of Appeals found them unsuited for substantial noninfringing uses.20 Ul-

Although the entertainment industry
now appears to regard peer-to-peer file sharing
as unprecedented and outrageous piracy, it
must have had an equally strong feeling toward
Betamax VTRs twenty years ago." Many studios feared that
the home-tap"Although VTRs could be used for
ing of television
programs
such an infringing purpose as
would replace
making tape libraries, they could
real-time television viewing,
also be used for authorized taping
dissuade people
of television programs or for such a
from going to
the cinema, and
fair use as time-shifting"
altogether cause
a catastrophe to
filmmaking
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timately, the Supreme Court endorsed the holdings of the District Court and rejected the plaintiffs' copyright infringement claims. 21 It first
indicated that the Copyright Act did not expressly provide for vicarious or contributory
liability for copyright infringement, but that the
absence of such a provision did not preclude
liability.22 Then the Supreme Court, by turn23
ing to the Patent Act as the closest analogue,
adopted the "staple article of commerce" theory
as the appropriate means of evaluating claims
of vicarious liability or contributory infringement. The doctrine holds that "the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of
commerce, does not constitute contributory
infringement if the product is widely used for
legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed,
it need merely be capable of substantial
noninfringing uses." 24 Although VTRs could
be used for such an infringing purpose as making tape libraries, they could also be used for
authorized taping of television programs or for
such a fair use as time-shifting. The latter two
noninfringing uses were substantial enough to
absolve Sony of any indirect copyright liability.25 The Supreme Court also articulated the
policy underpinning of such a holding: "The
staple article of commerce doctrine must strike
a balance between a copyright holder's legitimate demand for effective - not merely symbolic - protection of the statutory monopoly,
and the rights of others freely to engage in sub26
stantially unrelated areas of commerce."

II.
Misapplication of the Sony
Doctrine in Recent Internet-related
Cases
In the recent decade, the traditional
copyright landscape has been drastically
changed by the advent of digital technology.
Digital technology empowers average consumers to make near-perfect unauthorized copies
of copyrighted works and distribute such copies globally merely with several clicks on computer keyboards.27 Therefore, it would be prohibitively expensive for copyright holders to
police all the computer users in the privacy of
their homes or initiate lawsuits against thousands of infringers one by one.28 Even though
copyright enforcement actions against individual infringers are practically feasible, the lim-

ited financial capabilities of most infringers
would render ostensible litigation victories
mostly futile. 29 Moreover, the scenario of big
conglomerates versus small individuals would
probably result in negative publicity, which
could consequently undermine copyright industries' customer base and political sympathy. 0 For those practical and political concerns,
copyright holders find themselves chasing direct copyright infringements largely in vain,
with every end user being a potential infringer.
To surmount such difficulties arising
from digital technology, many right holders
seek to change their enforcement strategies.
They, inter alia, increasingly assert indirect liabilities of technology providers who make end
user infringements possible and who tend to
be more readily identifiable and have deeper
pockets. Facing this new wave of claims for
indirect copyright liability, courts heavily rely
on the seminal Sony case for guidance on how
to reconcile the relationship between copyright
protection and technological advances. However, among a variety of applications by lower
32
3
courts, a few, including MAPHIA, Netcom,
and Napster,33 were arguably inconsistent with
the essence of the Sony doctrine. This section
will discuss why those cases should be considered diversions from the teachings of the Supreme Court, and meanwhile explore the original implications of the Sony doctrine.

A. Does the Sony Doctrine
Apply to Contributory Infrin ement as Well as Vicarious -Liability?
Indirect copyright liability basically consists of two branches: contributory infringement and vicarious liability. In addition to the
occurrence of at least one direct infringement, 34
each of these two theories requires two additional prongs. Contributory infringement arises
when the defendant "induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of
another," with actual or constructive knowledge
of the infringing activity.35 Vicarious liability
arises when the defendant possesses "the right
and ability to supervise the infringing conduct"
and has "an obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials. ' 36 More often than not, contributory infringement and vicarious liability are jointly al-
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leged or even
merged in prac"...it would be prohibitively
37
tice.
expensive for copyright holders to
In the
recent Napster
police all the computer users in the
case, the appellate court interprivacy of their homes or initiate
preted the Sony
lawsuits against thousands of
as
doctrine
"having no apinfringers one by one."
plication to [the
defendant's] potential liability
for vicarious copyright infringement," since technologies to vicarious liability. Under the
doctrines of vicarious liability "were not before Fonovisa test, the first prong of vicarious liabilthe Supreme Court. ' 38 In other words, the Sony ity, namely "financial interest," can be satisfied
doctrine provides a defense only to contribu- by showing that the infringing uses of a techtory infringement, not to vicarious liability. nology "act as a draw for customers," or in other
However, a more cautious reading of the Sony words, "enhance the attractiveness of a
case may not lead to such a conclusion. As in- venue." 45 This interpretation basically renders
dicated by many commentators, 39 the Supreme this prong superfluous, since even household
Court used the terms "vicarious liability" and articles like a knife and paper can also arguably
"contributory infringement" interchangeably have some "draw" to potential wrongdoers due
throughout the opinion, in a generic sense to their capability of misuse. The second prong,
which was broad enough to cover both the "right and ability to supervise direct infringbranches of indirect copyright liability.4" For ers," can be established by relying on findings
example, the Supreme Court stated that "vi- that the defendant reserved its right to block
carious liability is imposed in virtually all areas its service to any consumer at will.46 However,
of the law, and the concept of contributory in- almost all software providers may legally reserve
fringement is merely a species of the broader such termination rights via shrink-wrap or
problem of identifying the circumstances in click-wrap license, 47 and due to the high mawhich it is just to hold one individual account- nipulability of computer software, may exerable for the actions of another."41 More impor- cise such rights without substantial technical
48
tantly, the Supreme Court even explicitly indi- difficulty.
cated in a footnote that, given that "the lines
The looming clouds of vicarious liabilbetween direct infringement, contributory in- ity will coerce Internet technology providers to
fringement and vicarious liability are not clearly extensively monitor and censor online content
drawn...the reasoned analysis of respondents' distributions. 49 Because of the complexity of
unprecedented contributory infringement copyright doctrines 50 and the sheer volume of
claim necessarily entails consideration of argu- digital transmission, any policing of online
ments and case law which may also be for- copyright infringement must involve considwarded under the other labels."42
erable financial and human resources. 5' TechAside from this express language in the nology providers will therefore suffer a signifiSony opinion, the policy underpinning of the cant increase in their operation costs. As to
Sony doctrine also supports its application to small Internet start-ups, such a burden may
vicarious liability. The Supreme Court made it even constitute an unsurpassable barrier for
clear that copyright monopolies could not be market access. 52 Furthermore, since the Sony
unduly extended to block the "wheels of com- doctrine has released most analog technologies
merce."43 However, the Napster court's denial from indirect copyright liability, the threat of
of the Sony defense to vicarious liability, coupled vicarious liability will be tantamount to a mewith its heavy reliance on the widely criticized dium-discriminative burden on all digital techFonovisa test, 44 may virtually expose all Internet nologies. The Internet industry as a whole will
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be severely hampered by this unequal, unprecedented treatment. In addition, the harsh imposition of vicarious liability on technology providers may also conflict with the ultimate public interests promoted by copyright law. On
one hand, it would raise private censorship to
such a socially undesirable level that it would
place an undue constraint on information access and free speech 3 in cyberspace. On the
other hand, ensuing intense investigations can
potentially cause excessive intrusion into con54
sumers' privacy.

B. Does the Sony Doctrine
Apply to Products as Well as
Services?
Sega Enterprises,Limited v. MAPHIA, one
of the earliest Internet-related copyright cases,
failed to apply the Sony doctrine to continuing
BBS services and only analyzed the
noninfringing uses associated with freestanding software copiers." Likewise, the district
court in Napster tried to distinguish the Sony
case on the ground that the defendant here exercised "on-going control" over its service by
retaining the ability to block access to subscribers, while Sony controlled its users only at the
point of sale.5 6 This holding obviously endorsed
the plaintiff's assertion that "Napster is not the
same, legally, as the VTR, because it is a service,
rather than an 'article of commerce,' a product." 17

direct infringement, to which the Sony doctrine
is of course unavailable.59 However, if it were
said that the Sony doctrine should never have
any application beyond the narrow fact-pattern
of product manufacture or distribution, such a
contention would be troubling in four respects
at least.
First, as mentioned above, the Napster
court went to great lengths to ascertain the distinction between contributory infringement
and vicarious liability, noting "that Sony's 'staple
article of commerce' analysis has no application to Napster's potential liability for vicarious
copyright infringement."6" However, "on-going control" is not an intrinsic consideration in
the context of contributory infringement, but
is traditionally seen as one of the two prongs
for vicarious liability.61 By extending this vicarious liability prong into the arena of contributory infringement, the Napster court appeared
to cause the sort of confusion it had tried to
warn against and prevent.
Second, this "on-going control" test is
exactly the same as the depiction in the classic
indirect trademark infringement case of Inwood
Laboratories,Inc. v. Ives Laboratories,Inc.62 However, the Supreme Court in Sony explicitly rejected the analogy of indirect trademark infringement by saying that "given the fundamental differences between copyright law and
trademark law, in this copyright case we do not
look to the standard for contributory infringement set forth in
rtrademark
cases]."63 Therefore, Napster's
usage of the "ongoing control"
prong may be
directly at odds
with the Sony
"
doctrine conmp at u Ly
the
Supreme
Court.
Third, one can hardly draw a clear line
between service and product by the criterion
of "on-going control." In many events, a "service" provider, despite the retention of a theoretical right to terminate consumer access to its
service, may act even more passively than a
"product" provider, and vice versa. For ex-

"The Supreme Court made it
clear
that
copyright
monopolies could not be
unduly extended to block the
'wheels of commerce.
This approach of the service/product dichotomy does have some merit,5 8 to the extent
that it correctly indicates that Sony might not
be an excuse for active participation in infringing activities; such participation often takes the
form of continuing service. In many cases, active participation itself can plainly be held as
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ample, while you may safely characterize power
supply as a service and water supply as a product, how can you determine which provider
would have more control? Arguably, even Sony
could also exercise considerable control over
VTRs by installing a jamming system to control recording or simply keeping its products
off the market, both of which were actually
projected by the plaintiffs but rejected by the
district court in Sony. 64 In terms of computer
software technologies, courts have long
struggled with the difficulty in classifying them
either as freestanding products or as on-going
services. 65 Especially upon the arrival of the
Internet, whether software is freestanding or
under the on-going control of the author/owner
depends merely on whether it is hooked
online. 66 In short, the dichotomy of service/
product may add more confusion than guidance to the already muddy rules of the Sony
doctrine.
Finally, in cyberspace, classifying digital technologies as services or products will only
lead to two extremes. On one end is the boom
of decentralized software applications like
Gnutella and Freenet. 67 To avoid any "on-going control," providers of such technologies cut
off any contact with consumers upon delivery.
The products are presented as pure products
without any central server, without technical
support, and even without after-sale service.
However, in the long run, consumers will encounter more difficulty in seeking reliable software providers. On the other end is the chilling scenario that no digital technology evades
the doom of being considered an on-going service. As described above, in order to preclude
copyright liabilities, technology providers are
forced to intervene with private content distributions, which drives consumers' interests
68
largely out of the picture.

C. Is Actual or Constructive
Knowledge Relevant to the
Sony Doctrine?
The appellate court in Napster, quoting
69
stated: "We observe that [the
defendant]'s actual, specific knowledge of direct infringement renders Sony's holding of limited assistance to [the defendant]," 70 and "we
agree that if a computer system operator learns
of specific infringing material available on its

Netcom,
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system and fails to purge such material from
the system, the operator knows of and contributes to direct infringement." 71 In effect, this
holding inserted a "lack of actual knowledge"
element into the Sony doctrine, irrespective of
any substantial noninfringing use. Thus,
Napster transforms the Sony doctrine, which
denies any indirect copyright liability if the accused technology is "merely ...
capable of substantial noninfringing uses,"'72 into a rebuttable
presumption that simply places a notice requirement on the plaintiff.
It is questionable whether one can read
out of the Sony opinion such an intention to
associate the application of "substantial
noninfringing uses" with the "knowledge"
prong in contributory infringement. 73 One can
hardly imagine that Sony would have been held
liable if it proceeded to engage in the VTR business upon receipt of notice from copyright
holders.74 In the Sony opinion, the Supreme
Court never elaborated on actual knowledge
or any other prong of vicarious liability or contributory infringement. This may indicate that,
as many commentators 75 and the district court
in Napster76 assent, the Supreme Court only
intended the Sony doctrine to be an affirmative
defense to any indirect copyright liability instead of some evidential instrumentality. Even
if all three requirements for either contributory
infringement or vicarious liability were met, a
technology provider would nevertheless be free
from liability for offering the technology capable of substantial noninfringing uses. 77 To
the contrary, some lower courts properly interpret the Sony doctrine as an affirmative defense.
For instance, in Vault Corporation v. Quaid Software Limited,78 the Fifth Circuit quoted the Sony
case in holding that a software manufacturer
was not liable for contributory infringement on
the basis that the accused infringing program
could also be used to make archive copies as
plainly allowed under the Copyright Act.79 The
court reached this conclusion in spite of the fact
that the manufacturer explicitly conceded that
it had actual knowledge that its products were
used to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material."s
Another problem with the "actual
knowledge" analysis is whether receipt of notice from copyright holders can be equal to technology providers' actual knowledge.81 As the
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court in Netcom admitted, even after the Internet
service providers had received actual notice
from copyright holders of a particular allegedly
infringing activity, such knowledge was insufficient for contributory infringement where the
providers could not "reasonably verify a claim
of infringement, either because of a possible fair
use defense, the lack of copyright notices on
the copies, or the copyright holder's failure to
provide the necessary documentation to show
that there is a likely infringement."8 2 Besides,
it would be naYve of a court to preclude the
possibility that copyright holders may maliciously assert false information, say, for the purpose of intervening others' business operations.
When copyright holders' notice is inconsistent
with the truth, technology providers as a matter of fact receive no actual knowledge upon
receipt of notice. It appears that, absent such
complicated notice and take-down procedures
as described in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") safe harbors,8 3 the "actual
knowledge" approach could incur many controversies while being implemented.

D. What Does It Mean to be
Capable
of
Substantial
Noninfringing Uses?
The Sony doctrine largely hinges on the meaning of "capable of substantial noninfringing
uses." 84 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court
failed to provide a clear-cut definition of that
phrase in the Sony opinion. One may only find
some clues in its uses of other terminology apparently describing the same thing: "capable
of commercially significant noninfringing
uses" 85 and when "a significant number of [uses
of the product] would be noninfringing." 6
In the face of this problem, one can first

think of varied technologies as falling along a
continuum ranging from those having only infringing uses to those having only legitimate
uses. If all technologies appear on the two ends
of the continuum, we will have little difficulty
in defining their legal statuses. In reality, most
innovative technologies will have a place somewhere in the middle, having both legitimate
and illegitimate uses. To draw the line between
the two extremes, courts and commentators
conceived of many options. The following four
87
are normally deemed as representative.

1. Primarily Used for Infringing Purposes
The district court in Napster held that
fair uses of a file-sharing technology were "not
substantial enough to preclude indirectly liability" when the traffic to its website resulted
chiefly from the technology's ability to assist
copyright infringement. 8 In addition, the court
rejected an obvious noninfringing use as irrelevant under the Sony doctrine because it was
an afterthought that was not launched until the
plaintiffs filed the suit.89 In sum, if an Internet
technology is primarily used for infringing purposes at the time of the lawsuit, none of its emerging or future noninfringing uses could be considered commercially significant. 90
This approach appears to be a very restrictive reading of the Sony doctrine, as it arguably inserts an unusual timing requirement
that did not exist in the original Sony holdings. 91
Taken literally, the wording "capable of substantial noninfringing uses" (emphasis added) instead of "currently used for substantial
noninfringing uses" indicates that the Supreme
Court intended the Sony doctrine to be a forward-looking flexible test. In applying this doctrine, courts are
required to con-

ouds ofsider
"The
looming cl
vicarious liability w ill coerce
Internet technology p roviders to
extensively monitor a lu censor
online content distributions:'
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the

full

technical capability and market potential of a
new technology. 92 Accordingly, the assessment
of
noninfringing
uses necessarily
encompasses all
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the current and future uses of the technology,
regardless of whether they are pre-existing, an
afterthought, or even non-existing at the time
of lawsuit. To otherwise arbitrarily curb the
test at any given time, courts would run the
risk of depriving many innovative technologies
of the opportunity to mature into mainstream
and predominantly legitimate tools after
the initial stage
intrinsic coi
of being mis"... 'on-going
used by some
rnntfvf

I

an endToto put
the
consumers.93

95

2. Substantial Infringing Use
Addressing the Sony doctrine, Professor Goldstein advocated that "courts should..
• apply a comparative, rather than an absolute,
measure in determining whether an infringing
use is substantial, and should hold the defendant [liable] for infringement only if the infringing uses of its material or equipment are substantial as compared to their noninfringing
uses." 96 The essence of his proposal is to compare all the potential uses for infringing and
noninfringing purposes, then determine which
one is predominant in quantity and/or in significance. To the extent that this approach does
not freeze the Sony test with any artificial timing, it has manifest superiority over the "primarily used for noninfringing purposes" approach.
However, this approach appears to have
its own difficulties. First, in such a fast-growing area as the Internet, 97 any prediction on
whether an emerging technology will later turn
out to be predominantly infringing would be
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control' is not an

nsideration in the
:)f
contributory
infringement , but is traditionally
seen as one c f the two prongs for
lia
vicarious liah ility."'

chaos sparked
by the "prima- k
rily used for infringing purposes"
approach, 94 the appellate court in Napster explicitly rejected the district court's reasoning and
criticized its analysis for "ignoring the system's
capabilities" and "plac[ing] undue weight on
the proportion of current infringing use as compared to current and future noninfringing
use."

highly speculative, if not entirely impossible.
It is particularly true that the judiciary, limited
by its constitutional authority, is notoriously illequipped to make any technical or business
judgment with a profound impact on social
interests beyond the confines of the courtroom. 98 As a result, this difficulty in applica-

tion could add much uncertainty, inconsistency,
and unpredictability to the Sony doctrine.
Secondly, this approach is in effect
analogous to the dissenting opinion in the Sony
case.99 The majority in Sony explicitly held that
"in order to resolve that question [of substantial noninfringing uses], we need not explore
all the different potential uses of the machine
and determine whether or not they would constitute infringement."' 10 0 The majority also
quoted the district court, stating, "[w]hatever
the future percentage of legal versus illegal
home-use recording might be, an injunction
which seeks to deprive the public of the very
tool or article of commerce capable of some
noninfringing use would be an extremely harsh
remedy, as well as one unprecedented in copyright law."' 0 ' These holdings signal the Supreme Court's preference to weigh all the potential noninfringing uses of a technology in
isolation, not in comparison to its other infringing uses.
Thirdly, the "staple article of commerce"
theory in the patent context, in which the Sony
doctrine is deeply rooted, implicates a rather
low threshold for "substantial noninfringing
uses." Patent cases generally find a technology
capable of substantial noninfringing uses, unless it is "unsuited for any commercial
noninfringing use" or has "no use except
10 2
through practice of the patent method."
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court based its
finding of substantial noninfringing uses alternatively and sufficiently on authorized timeshifting uses, which only accounted for 7.3%
of total uses.10 3 This also suggests that even a
minority use of a technology may be "substantial" enough for the purpose of the Sony doctrine. 104

3. Staple Article of Commerce
Many cases after the Sony decision have
attempted to narrow its holdings to specific
facts only concerning "staple articles of commerce." For example, one court indicated that
"the Sony doctrine only applies to 'staple articles or commodities of commerce,' such as
VCRs, photocopiers, and blank, standardlength cassette tapes. Its protection would not
extend to products specifically manufactured
for counterfeiting activity, even if such prod'
In
ucts have substantial noninfringing uses."105
other words, "staple article of commerce" constitutes a new prong for the Sony doctrine in
addition to "capable of substantial noninfringing
uses.,
This proposal will meet with an obvious problem of eggs and chickens. When a
new technology comes out, it is only a fancy
machine that people know very little about,
with an unpredictable fate in the courtroom as
well as the marketplace. If the technology is
later held to be an infringing article, it would
probably be eliminated from the market and
never have the opportunity to grow into a staple
article of commerce. Only if it enjoys shelter
from fatal legal claims can it possibly enter into
the mainstream of commerce. When this
"staple article of commerce" approach requires
us to first determine its market status and then,
based on that, determine its legal status, courts
may find themselves in an endless circle of reasoning.

4. Independent Justification of
Noninfringing use
Professor Dogan proposed that being "capable
of substantial noninfringing uses" for purposes
of the Sony doctrine should mean that the
noninfringing use alone would justify the development and distribution of the product; otherwise the public is not being deprived of a
neutral staple, but of a product that is made

possible solely by infringement. 1 6 This approach seems to make the most sense since it
corresponds to the Supreme Court's objective
to protect the legitimate interest of "substantially unrelated areas of commerce." 107 If a technology cannot possibly achieve any commercial significance independent of its infringing
use, it should not be qualified as an unrelated
However, if the
area of commerce.
noninfringing use alone can still justify the development or exploitation of the technology,
such technology should be deemed to be
among the "useful arts" promoted by the Con10 8
gress.
This approach has actually been applauded by several federal courts, which concluded that if a product had little likelihood of
market success based solely on the
noninfringing use, its provider should not escape indirect copyright liability of the infringing uses. 9 The Sony case itself, on one occasion, also seemed to imply this approach by stating that when the authorized uses of VTRs are
in such a significant number as to "create a substantial market for a noninfringing use ... the
legitimacy of that market is not [to be] compromised." 110
One may argue that this approach will
allow a new technology to be marketed even if
it has substantial infringing uses. The technology provider would then be able to derive profits not only from its own contributions to the
technology, but also from some unauthorized
uses of copyrighted works of authorship."' This
is tantamount to compelling authors to subsidize the information technology industry. However, such an unfortunate sacrifice appears to
be unavoidable as a necessary social cost to
stimulate technology innovations. To stipulate
otherwise, authors would conversely capture
involuntary subsidies from a technology's
noninfringing uses such as copying public domain works. 1 12 The more substantial the
noninfringing uses are, the more impediments
such subsidization would create to the technology. In the face of the dilemma between full
protection of authors' interests and availability
of substantially unrelated technologies, many
courts are prone to resolve the tension in favor
of technological innovation.1 3
Moreover, absolving some technology
providers from indirect copyright liability does
not mean that copyright holders are totally deVanderbilt Journal of Entertainment Law & Practice
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void of remedies for the unlawful copying their
works via those technologies. They may seek
deterrence of direct infringements with the aid
of other enforcement strategies, such as enhanced criminal penalties 14 and technological
15
self-help.

III. Why Is the Sony Doctrine Still
Relevant in the Digital Age?

come into play side-by-side with the DMCA
safe harbors.
The DMCA safe harbors hardly bear any
superiority over the Sony doctrine, let alone preempt it. The first two safe harbors, for "transitory digital network communications" 121 and
"system caching," 122 seem to be of little assistance to the technology providers addressed in
this Article, as they mainly engage in software
developments. By definition, these two safe
harbors were aimed to protect providers of
Internet hardware infrastructures such as wires,
circuits, or servers.
The other two safe harbors 1 23 may
squarely apply to certain software technology
providers, yet they are to a great extent only
illusory in the context of indirect copyright liability. To qualify for these two safe harbors,
among other things, a service provider, (1) must
not have actual knowledge that the material or

One may argue that the advent of digital technology and the Internet has drastically revolutionized the landscape of information generation and flow. Accordingly, most traditional
copyright doctrines, which largely aimed to
cope with out-of-date analog media problems,
seem archaic in the digital age. 1 16 During the
last decade, the Copyright Act experienced
numerous modifications, including the enactment of the DMCA of 1998.1" Given this background,
one
should question
"Especially upon the arrival of
what role the
nearly twentyInternet, whether software is
year-old Sony
doctrine should
freestanding or under the onstill play in this
going control of the author/owner
so-call digital
millennium.
depends merely on whether it is
The following
section demonhooked online or not"
strates at least
three reasons
why the aging
Sony doctrine should retain its vitality.
activity is infringing and not be aware of facts
or circumstances from which infringing activA. The DMCA Does Not Su- ity is apparent, and (2) must not receive a fipersede the Sony Doctrine
nancial benefit directly attributable to the inThe DMCA provides four safe harbors fringing activity, in a case in which the service
for so-called "service providers.""1 8 Comply- provider has right and ability to control such
ing with the requirements of a safe harbor will activity.'24 Astonishingly, the first requirement
purportedly absolve a service provider of any is just one of the prongs for contributory indirect or indirect copyright liability." 9 At the fringement; the second requirement includes
same time, the DMCA stipulates, "The failure both prongs of vicarious liability.2 5 A service
of a service provider's conduct to qualify for provider will be sheltered from indirect copylimitation of liability under this section shall not right liability only if it is actually not liable for
bear adversely upon the consideration of a de- any indirect copyright liability in the first place.
fense by the service provider that the service
The above analyses illustrate an irony
provider's conduct is not infringing under this in that, although technology providers as well
title or any other defense." 120 In other words, as copyright holders fought hard for the pasthe DMCA does not preempt any traditional sage of the DMCA, most of the digital copycopyright defense. Thus, the Sony doctrine may right cases still call for application of pre-DMCA
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copyright regimes such as the Sony doctrine. 126

B. Sony Has Proven to be a
Wise Win-Win Decision
As mentioned above, to many copyright holders' despair, the Supreme Court in
Sony opted to foster the unfettered development and commercialization of new technology as an effort to strike the balance between
effective copyright protection and freedom of
engaging in substantially unrelated areas of
commerce.

1 27

direct Internet communications between artists and consumers diminish the market power
of intermediaries. 132 Moreover, authors and
copyright owners would generally be able to
eliminate vast marginal costs associated with
traditional hard copy distribution, such as trans133
portation, storage and display costs.
What makes the Sony doctrine most significant is that the judicial endorsement of technology innovations, whether last century's VTR
or more recently the Internet, will eventually

Nevertheless,
the predicted
box-office collision never happened to the
motion picture
industry, and
the total value of
box-office sales
has
stably
grown
from
four billion to
nine and a half
billion dollars since Sony.1 28 Moreover, movie offer enormous benefits to the general public.
studios found themselves with a new and enor- As the Supreme Court articulated in Sony as
mously profitable channel of distribution, made well as on numerous other occasions, in order
possible entirely by the widespread introduc- to fulfill the Constitution's objective, 34 copytion of VTRs. In the late 1990s, the rentals and right law must preserve the dedicate balance
sales of video cassettes exceeded six million units between "the interest of the writer in the coneach year. 29 In this sense, the wisdom of the trol and exploitation of his intellectual property
Sony doctrine actually gave birth to two dy- ...and the competing interest of society in the
namic new industries: the home electronic in- untrammeled dissemination of ideas.' ' 35 It is
dustry for technology providers and the home even repeatedly asserted that copyright law
entertainment industry for copyright holders. merely "makes reward to the owner a secondInternet technologies, such as BBS and ary consideration," and that "the sole interest
peer-to-peer file sharing, definitely have the of the United States and the primary object in
potential to grow into digital versions of VTR. conferring the copyright monopoly lies in the
Although the copyright industry tends to de- general benefits derived by the public from the
pict many Internet technologies as piracy ha- labors of authors."' 136 Liberating information
vens and authors' worst nightmares, probably technology from overstretched copyright liabilas a courtroom strategy, such technologies may ity will notably increase the likelihood of buildturn out to confer substantial benefits on au- ing a decentralized communications infrastructhors and other copyright holders. 130 For ex- ture and promoting the public interests in free
ample, Internet technologies open new market flow of information. 137 Traditional mass mehorizons for alternative or young artists by dia, like journalism or television, entail substanmaking their works available to millions of con- tial financial resources that only a limited numsumers without relying on mainstream chan- ber of entrepreneurial intermediaries can afnels such as major record labels or publishing ford. As the Internet and other digital techhouses.13' Even established artists may also gain nologies dramatically lower the threshold costs
a greater share of copyright revenues, while for public communication, they enable indi-

"...some lower courts have

properly interpreted the
Sony doctrine as an
affirmative defense.
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vidual consumers to communicate information
directly to the general public. In this sense,
average people gain more realistic opportunities to participate in social discourse and fully
exercise their freedom of speech. Consequently,
digital technologies enormously augment the
quantity and diversity of information available
to the public, in that multiple information
sources are substituted for the bottleneck created by conventional intermediaries. 138 Yet, an
overbroad copyright regime may perpetuate
the information bottleneck and diminish the
social benefits brought by decentralized communications in cyberspace. For instance, undue expansion of indirect copyright liability
would have a chilling effect on technology providers.139 As a result, technology providers
would be compelled to censor too much information flow on the Internet and would become
a new generation of centralized intermediaries.
In addition to thwarting information production, over-censorship would result in high operation costs associated with online services,
which consequently would inflate the price of
40
information access to the general public.
In a nutshell, the lasting vitality of the
Sony doctrine lies in its particular mindfulness
of the delicate balance between authors' interests in control and exploitation of their intellectual creations, unfettered technology innovations in means of dissemination, and the ultimate public interest in the free flow of information. 141 In increasingly frequent confrontation with novel copyright issues generated by
emerging technologies, modern courts can still
learn from the wisdom of the Sony doctrine and
its underlying win-win philosophy.
In addition to establishment of the Sony
doctrine, another significant contribution of the
Sony case is that it provided compelling strategic teachings for courts facing the challenge of
a new technology. The Supreme Court repeatedly counseled that,
Congress has the constitutional authority and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied permutations of
competing interests that are inevitably
implicated by such new technology...
The judiciary's reluctance to expand the
protections afforded by the copyright
without explicit legislative guidance is a
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recurring theme ... Sound policy, as
well as history, supports out consistent
deference to Congress when major technological innovations alter 42the market
for copyrighted materials.
The judiciary's conservative role in reconciling copyright and technology developments rests on policy reasons beyond the canon
of stare decisis. As the Restatement of Unfair
Competition notes, rule-making in intellectual
property law is best left to legislation because
143
of the area's inherent intricacy and subtlety.
For instance, any rule-making initiative to expand exclusive rights must begin with an investigation of whether the current legal regime
has already caused underproduction in information. 44 One must then ascertain whether
any alternatives exist, such as contracts or encryption, with which producers may utilize selfhelp measures to cure the problem. 45 Third,
assessment of possible legal impacts on technological innovations requires sophisticated understanding of the various technology issues
that are involved. The above investigations
could be so time-consuming and prohibitively
expensive that any court could hardly afford to
carry them out during relatively short periods
of individual actions. 1 46 Moreover, expansion
of property rights in information may affect a
wide variety of interest groups, including educational entities, libraries, research institutes, and
even governmental bodies. Therefore, to accommodate all the competing interests to the
greatest extent, rule-makers must establish a
forum for wide social discourses. Because the
disputes in action are usually narrowed between
parties in the courtroom, courts systematically
tend to overlook interests outside the courtroom
and potential costs to society as a whole.147 In
light of those institutional limitations in the judiciary, self-empowered rule-makings will add
to the uncertainty of law and jeopardize the
integrity of legal system.
Ultimately, a cautious lower court that
is confronted with thorny problems imposed
by new technologies should not harshly extend
the statutory copyright monopoly to stifle the
technological innovation, but should preserve
the balance achieved by statutes and precedents
between the competing interests of encouraging copyright holders and furthering the pub-

354

Why Is Betamax an Anachronism in the Digital Age?
lic welfare. Until the Sony case is overruled by
the Supreme Court or by a legislative instrument,148 a lower court should faithfully follow
the holdings of the Sony case and be mindful
of its constitutional role in the legal system.

IV. Conclusion

the noninfringing uses would alone justify the development and distribution
of the product; and
E.
Its policy underpinning is to
strike a balance between a copyright
holder's legitimate demand for effective,
not merely symbolic, protection of the
statutory monopoly, and the rights of
others to freely engage in substantially
unrelated areas of commerce.

Copyright law history has witnessed the
emergence of an endless line of technologies
that facilitate more efficient reproduction, manipulation, and dissemination of copyrighted
Of course, this Article is not an attempt
149
works of authorship. In the past, piano rolls,
to foreclose further debates on the validity and
cable television, 150 photocopiers,15 ' VTRs,'15 and interpretation of the Sony doctrine. Arguably,
MP3 players 15 3 all sparked much debate on more evidence will soon emerge showing that
their formidable threats to meaningful copy- the fast growth of information technologies has
right protection. In each instance, however, outstripped the Sony doctrine, or that the Sony
courts managed to assimilate the new technol- doctrine is not the right place to draw the copyogy into the existing legal framework, often cre- right balance between competing social interating an unexpected but lucrative avenue of ests. Nevertheless, even if the time finally
profits for copyright holders. 54 The wisdom comes to declare the Sony doctrine an anachroof these successful cases lies, inter alia, in its nism in cyberspace, it should be Congress that
particular attentiveness to the inherent balance informs the judiciary-not vice versa.
in copyright law -the balance between authors'
interests in control and exploitation of their intellectual creations and the unfettered technolENDNOTES
ogy innovations in means of dissemination and
the ultimate public interest in free flow of inPh.D. Candidate, the Intellectual Property
formation.
Center, China Academy of Social Sciences;
As the Sony doctrine is undoubtedly LL.M., University of Washington Law School.
among the best reflections of the balancing The author wishes to acknowledge Professor
philosophy in copyright law, this Article sug- Chengsi Zheng for his insightful comments and
gests that courts should give it the utmost re- his seminal works from which this article drew
spect. To reestablish the Sony doctrine in an most of its inspirations.
unambiguous and consistent way, Congress
may consider codifying the doctrine alongside
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Stuthe DMCA safe harbors. Alternatively, the Su- dios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) [hereinafter
preme Court may refresh and further clarify Sony].
the Sony doctrine to curb the chaotic applications of lower courts. The essence of the Sony 2 By "indirect liability," this article refers to such
doctrine should at least include the following a legal notion that one, without direct involvemaxims or guidelines:
ment in the infringing activity, is held accountable for the infringement conducted by another
A.
It applies to both contributory party. To this extent, "indirect liability" is in
infringement and vicarious liability;
most cases interchangeable with "third-party
B.
It applies to both service provid- liability" or "secondary liability." See, e.g., Eders and product providers;
ward A. Cavazos and G. Chin Chao, System
C.
It is an affirmative defense for in- Operator Liability of a User's Copyright Infringedirect copyright liability instead of a re- ment, 4 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 13, 14 (1995) (sysbuttable presumption;
tem operators "are susceptible to both claims
D.
"Capable
of
substantial of direct infringement and the various forms
noninfringing uses" should mean that of third-party liability, such as contributory in-
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fringement and vicarious liability."); Stacey L.
Dogan, Infringement Once Removed: The Perils
of Hyperlinking to Infringing Content, 87 IowA L.
REV. 829, 832 n.4. (2002) (" 'Secondary liability'
refers to liability for acts of infringement committed by another party.").
I See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
4 See

35 U.S.C. § 271(c) ("Whoever offers to sell
or sells within the United States or imports into
the United States a component of a patented
machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in
practicing a patented process, constituting a
material part of the invention, knowing the same
to be especially made or especially adapted for
use in an infringement of such patent, and not
a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be
liable as a contributory infringer."). The Supreme Court in Sony named it the "staple article of commerce" doctrine. See Sony, 464 U.S.
at 491. In order to differentiate between copyright and patent doctrines, this article refers to
it as the "Sony doctrine" in the context of copyright law.
5 Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
6 For

Sony's influences on the marketplace, see
infra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.

controlled by a computer. Users of BBSs can
transfer information from their own computers to the storage media on the BBS by a process known as 'uploading.' Users can also retrieve information from the BBS to their own
computer memories by a process known as
'downloading.' " See Sega Enter. Ltd. v.
MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 927 (N.D. Cal.
1996).
9 Peer-to-peer file sharing is a computer software technology by which individuals can
search for and share files that reside on the hard
drives of other personal computers connected
to the Internet. See A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal.
2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004
(9th Cir. 2001).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ...[tlo promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.").
10 See

" For more illustrations of factual similarity between Sony and recent Internet technologies,
see infra notes 127-33 and accompanying text.
See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp.
of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 451 (C. D. Cal.
1979) (weighing the potential harms of VTRs
to filmmakers' copyrights, as part of the four
prongs in a fair use analysis).
12

In this article, the collective term "Internet
technology providers" basically refers to providers of software technology, like Internet Explorer, Real player and Napster, rather than
providers of hardware infrastructure, like wires
and servers. In this sense, Internet technology
providers are substantially distinct from "service providers" as defined by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 ("DMCA"). See
17 U.S.C. § 512(k) (an online service provider
is "a provider of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor" and
includes entities engaged in transitory digital
network communications).
7

A bulletin board system ("BBS") is a set of
"electronic storage media, such as computer
memories or hard disks, which are connected
to telephone lines by modem devices, and are
8
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See Home Recording of Copyrighted Works:
Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 8 (1982), available at http:/
/www.gnu-darwin.org/hrcw-hear.htm.
13

See Universal City Studios, Inc., 480 F. Supp.
at 432. In fact, the plaintiffs also sued a number of retailers that sold the Betamax VTRs, an
advertising agency that promoted it, and an
individual who used the device in his home to
record the plaintiffs' programs for his own personal use.
14

" Id. "Time-shifting" refers to the practice of
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taping a television program to view it once at a
later time. Time-shifting enables viewers to see
programs they otherwise would miss because
they are not at home, are occupied with other
tasks, or are viewing a program on another station at the time of a broadcast that they desire
to watch.

TELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMA-

"Fair use" refers to "a privilege in others than
the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted
material in a reasonable manner without his
consent, notwithstanding the monopoly
granted to the owner by the copyright". See

28

16

PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: LAW, POLICY AND

PRAC-

TICE § 10.1 (1996).

Universal City Studios, Inc., 480 F. Supp. at
442-56. The district court took typewriters,
cameras, and photocopying machines as other
examples of staple articles of commerce with
substantial noninfringing uses.

114, 124 (1995) available
at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/
ipnii/ipnii.pdf (describing the development of
the need for strict liability to Internet service
providers for subscriber copyright infringement).
TION INFRASTRUCTURE

See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of
Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying,
and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87
VA. L. REV. 813, 818-19 (2001) ("In the face of
widespread private copying, copyright's traditional approach of direct legal action against
each individual infringer would likely prove
ineffective.").

17

See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 659 F.2d 963, 969-71 (9th Cir.
1982).
18

19 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
20

Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d at 975.

See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).

See Michael B. Ruter, The ASCAP Licensing
Model and the Internet: A Potential Solution to
High-Tech Copyright Infringement, 39 B.C. L.
REV. 1061, 1070 (1998) (stating that the damages recoverable from individual defendants
would be minimal, even if a suit against individual users were successful).
29

See Jon Healey, Labels May Face Risk in Piracy
Suits, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 2003 at C1 (The article notes that the copyright suits could raise
sympathy for the file sharers and decrease support for the RIAA in Congress.).
30

21

One commentator pointed out that the Copyright Act grants the copyright owner, among
other rights, the exclusive right to authorize
others to exercise the various other exclusive
rights arising under the copyright (See 17 U.S.C.
§ 106). This provision could be deemed as the
statutory support of indirect copyright liability. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 12.04(A) (2001).

22

See Sega Enters., Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F.
Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding the defendants liable for providing BBS services to aid
Internet distribution of game software and providing specially made copiers to enable software
to be copied from diskettes and posted on the
BBS).
31

23

See 35 U. S. C. § 271(c) (2005).

24

See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.

See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line
Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that an Internet access provider should be acquitted of vicarious
liability, but might be liable for contributory
infringement when acquiring actual knowledge of direct infringement).

25

Id. at 443-56.

33 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114

26

Id. at 442.

27

See

RONALD

H. BROWN &

BRUCE

A.

LEHMAN, IN-

32

F. Supp. 2d 896, 910 (N.D. Cal. 2001), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001) (holding a provider of file-sharing technology liable for its users' copyright piracy, on
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment Law & Practice
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liability" was by no means a novel creation of
the Supreme Court, but rather a common practice among copyright literature, especially in the
14 However, joining the direct infringer as de1980s. See, e.g., Telerate Sys., Inc. v. Caro, 689
fendant in the action is not necessary for claims F. Supp. 221, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating that
of indirect liability. See, e.g., Danjaq, S. A. v. in the intellectual property context vicarious liMGM/UA Communications Co., 773 F. Supp. ability and contributory infringement are one
and the same); Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
194, 201 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
Nintendo Co., 615 F. Supp. 838, 857 (S.D.N.Y.
35 See Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Art- 1985), aff'd, 797 F.2d 70 (1986) (stating that a
ists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. party establishes vicarious liability by showing
1971) (holding that an artist manager and con- that "a party, with knowledge of the infringing
cert promoter was liable for infringing perfor- activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another.").
mance of a music group).
the grounds of contributory infringement and
vicarious liability).

See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green
Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963) (concluding that a store owner who retained supervision of and received a share of the profits derived from the sale of bootleg records was liable for copyright infringement occurring in
the store).
36

41See

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984).
42

Id. at 435 n.17.

13

Id. at 441.

See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76
F.3d 259, 261-62 (9th Cir. 1996). For scholarly
criticisms on this case, see Kenneth A. Walton,
Is a Website Like a Flea Market Stall? How
Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction Increases the Risk of
Third-Party Copyright Infringement Liability for
Online Service Providers, 19 HASTINGS COMM. &
38 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 ENT. L.J. 921, 924 (1997) (arguing that the
Fonovisa analysis was flawed and might be used
F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001).
unfairly against online service providers); see also
31 See Richard H. Stern, On Defining the Con- David Nimmer, Brains and Other Paraphernacept of Infringement of Intellectual Property lia of the Digital Age, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 34
Rights in Algorithms and Other Abstract Com- (1996) (warning that applying vicarious inpute-related Ideas, 23 AIPLAQJ 401, n.82 (1995) fringement liability to online service providers
suffocating the Net
("As the Supreme Court used the term in Sony, invited "massive lawsuits ...
of pre-cyberspace
flailing
blind
the
through
vicarious liability is a generic concept including any form of liability imposed on one hav- principles").
ing a culpable relationship to another's unlawful acts, and contributory infringement is a spe- 4- See Fonovisa, Inc., 76 F.3d at 263-64.
cies or subset of vicarious liability"); see also
Charles J. Meyer, Note, National and Interna- 46 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239
tional Copyright Liability for Electronic System F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001).
Operations,2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 497, 508
(1995) ("The Supreme Court explained the con- 47 The prototypical example of "shrink-wrap
cepts of contributory and vicarious liability in license" is license terms that have been wrapped
Universal City Studios v. Sony Corporation of in transparent plastic along with one or more
software disks; a user may accept these terms
America.").
by tearing the plastic wrap. "click-wrap li4°In actuality, the generic use of the terminol- cense", often deemed as digital progeny of
ogy "contributory infringement" or "vicarious "shrink-wrap license", refers to such license
44

See, e.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.,
76 F.3d 259, 261-62 (9th Cir. 1996) (a swap
meet operator was held contributorily and vicariously liable for independent vendors' sales
of infringing goods in the swap meet).

37
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terms that are displayed in a computer interface; a user may accept these terms by clicking
on the "YES" button therein. For a nice treatment of related legal issues, see Mark A. Lemley,
Intellectual Property and Shinkwrap Licenses, 68
S. CAL. L. REV. 1239 (1995).
For instance, it was once reported that Windows 98 could be used to monitor users' behavior through a unique identification number that would be automatically created on every computer that uses the operating system.
See Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright Infringement,
Enterprise Liability, and First Amendment, 88
GEO. L.J. 1833, 1864 (2000).

news.com.com/21001023955823.html?tag=bplst (August 28, 2002).
The Sony doctrine's effects on consumers' interests in free flow of information and First
Amendment rights will be further explored in
Section IV, Part B, infra.
53

48

See Assaf Hamdani, Who's Liable for
Cyberwrongs?, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (2002)
(articulating that, from a law and economic
perspective, because the incentives of Internet
service providers diverge from those of their
users, subjecting them to full liability would
produce excessive censorship of Internet communication).

Over-censorship may be in direct conflict
with such statutes as the Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 1986, which protects consumers' interests in the privacy of their communications. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2710. For
more information, see generally Patrick J.
Leahy, New Laws for New Technologies: Current
Issues Facing the Subcommittee on Technology and
the Law, 5 HARv. J. L. & TECH. 1, 10-13 (1992).
54

41

See, e.g., Artists Music, Inc. v. Reed Publ'g,
Inc., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1623, 1627 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(considering such policing impractical because
the defendant "would have had to hire several
investigators with the expertise to identify music, to determine whether it was copyrighted,
to determine whether the use was licensed, and
finally to determine whether the use was a 'fair
use'.").
50

Notably, it is exactly the same difficulty in
online enforcement that induced copyright
holders to change their enforcement strategies
by claiming indirect liability to technology providers. It is arguably unreasonable to shift onto
technology providers the burdens of copyright
enforcement incident to copyright ownership
as well as its benefits. See supra notes 27-30 and
accompanying text.
51

It was reported that Napster has been forced
by lawsuits to declare bankruptcy, and the
brand "Napster" as well as all its other assets
has been transferred to another company. See
generally John Borland, Napster's Bankruptcy
Road Nears End, CNET news.com, at http://
52

55 948 F. Supp. 923, 935 (N.D. Cal. 1996); see
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1365
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (This court did not take the
Sony doctrine into account at all in determining indirect copyright liability of Internet service providers).
See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114
F. Supp. 2d 896, 916-17 (N.D. Cal. 2000). The
appellate court in Napster seemed to at least
moderately side with the district court on the
position that "ability to block access" plus "actual knowledge" would disqualify the defendant for the immunity of the Sony doctrine.
See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d
1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001) ("The record supports the district court's finding that Napster
has actual knowledge ..., that it could block
access to the system by suppliers of the infringing material, and that it failed to remove the
material.").
56

See Sam Costello, How VCRs May Help
Napster's Legal Fight, Network World Fusion,
available at http://www.nwfusion.com/news/
2000/0725napstervcr.html (July 25, 2000).
17

58

Long before the Napster case, some commen-

tators had already proposed the service/product dichotomy while applying the Sony doctrine to cases concerning BBS copyright liabilities. See Kelly Tickle, Comment, The Vicarious
Liability of Electronic Bulletin Board Operators
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for the Copyright Infringement Occurring on Their
Bulletin Boards, 80 IowA L. REV. 391, n.151 (1995)
(While weighing the application of the Sony
doctrine, it is necessary to analyze the question,
"Does the BBS operator offer services or a type
of cyber product?").
" See RCA Records v. All-Fast Syss., Inc., 594 F.
Supp. 335, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (A retail copy
service was held liable where it not only provided access to a machine capable of making
copies of cassette tapes, but also had its employees perform the actual copying at the requests of customs); A & M Records, Inc. v. Gen.
Audio Video Cassettes, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1449
(C.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that the Sony doctrine could not exonerate the defendant when
his action went far beyond merely selling blank,
time-loaded tapes).
See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239
F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001).
60

Code).
See Laurence F. Pulgram, Beyond Napster:
Debating the Future of Copyright on the Internet,
50 AM. U. L. REV. 389, 404-05 (2000) ("Whether
it is characterized as a product, or as a service,
or as a device, or a network, doesn't really matter. Look, AOL can supervise its users, so can a
search engine ... . That doesn't make it incapable of substantial non-infringing uses or not
eligible for that defense. I really think that one
is a place where the law clearly is going to move,
as we recognize that any Internet service is going to include continuing relationships between
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I For an introduction of contributory infringement prongs, see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
I See Hisanari Harry Tanaka, Post-Napster:Peerto-Peer File Sharing Systems Current and Future
Issues on Secondary Liability under Copyright
Laws in the United State and Japan, 22 Loy. L.A.
ENT. L. REV. 37, 59 (2001) ("the provider should
not be held liable even if the provider later became aware of the actual infringement by the
users after the distribution of machinery/
goods").
I See Dogan, supra note 2, at 876 ("This view of
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Sony-as involving only the question of
whether to impute knowledge in contributory
infringement cases-is unusual and probably
does not reflect what the Supreme Court believed it was doing in Sony"); Aaron Johnson,
Note, Privates in Cyberspace: The Copyright Implications of A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), 80 NEB. L.
REV. 125, 143 (2001) ("Sony also introduced the
staple article of commerce doctrine as an affirmative defense to a claim of contributory copyright infringement."); Sarah H. McWane, Hollywood v. Silicon Valley: DeCSS Down, Napster
to Go?, 9 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 87, 89 (2001)
(stating that the Sony doctrine was as much an
affirmative defense as the fair use).

8 See Sony Corp of America v Universal City
Studios, Inc, 464 US 417, 442 (1984).
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This list of various interpretations of "capable
of substantial noninfringing uses" is not intended to be exclusive. This article omitted those
not in direct relation to Internet technologies.
Besides, in most cases, those omitted are either
only academic hypotheses with no statutory or
case-law support or step out of boundary even
further than the scenarios having been rejected
by this article. See, e.g., Ariel B. Taitz, Note, Re76 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114
moving Road Blocks Along the Information SuF. Supp. 2d 896, 912 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (discuss- perhighway: Facilitatingthe Dissemination of New
ing the "Affirmative Defense of Fair Use and Technology by Changing the Law of ContribuSubstantial Non-Infringing Use").
tory Copyright Infringement, 64 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 133, 159 (1995) (advocating a "non-trivial
I Even assuming the Sony doctrine is about any infringing uses" doctrine, which held the
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of contributory infringement may not consist McCambridge, Contributory Infringement by
of merely providing the 'means to accomplish Providing the Means: The Staple Article of Coman infringing activity'.").
merce Doctrine and An Alternative Analysis for
Copyright Law, 18 J.MARSHALL. L. REV. 703, (pro78 847 F.2d 255, 266-67 (5th Cir. 1988).
posing a four-factor weighing analysis for the
Sony doctrine, which included "the public in'917 U.S.C. § 117(a)(2) (2004).
terest in the device used as a means for infringement, the probable damage that continued in80 Vault Corp., 847 F.2d at 262.
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files.").
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See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line
Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
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See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g).
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F. Supp. 2d 896, 916 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
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Id. at 917 (Napster's "New Artists Program",
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artists not represented by major labels, "was
an afterthought, not a major aspect of the
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Napster business plan" and therefore did not
help preclude contributory infringement or vicarious liability).

and cons of such a comparative test, see infra
notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239
F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001).
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91 See, e.g., Peter Jaszi, Beyond Napster: Debating the Future of Copyright on the Internet, 50
AM. U. L. REV. 389, 397-98 (2000) ("Whatever
we mean by capability, the term suggests a standard which has some dynamic quality, rather
than one that is applied to and only to a static
snapshot of the situation as the court finds it at
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supra note 16, § 6.1.2.
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For a lengthier discussion of the judiciary's
role in regulating new technologies and copyright law, see infra notes 142-148 and accompanying text.
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See A. Samuel Oddi, Contributory Copyright
Infringement: the Tort and Technological Tensions,
64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 103 (1989) ("In sum,
the technical capability standard for contributory infringement establishes a fair, workable,
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accompanying text.
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Spring 2005

See Sony, 464 US at 494 (1984).

Several lower courts have held that a single
substantial noninfringing use would suffice to
acquit technology providers from indirect
copyright liability. See, e.g., Vault Corp. v. Quaid
Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 266-67 (5th Cir.
1988) (a technology that permitted copying of
software did not contributorily infringe copyright where it could be used to make archival
copies, without regard to the relative magnitude of the lawful use); see also Matthew Bender
104
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& Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 707 (2d
Cir. 1998) (the insertion of West's star pagination in its CD-ROM compilation of judicial
opinions qualified for the Sony doctrine, as long
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Cassettes, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1449, 1456 (C.D.
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Implications of Sony for Napster and Other
Internet Technologies, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 939, 953
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109 See, e.g., Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Vector
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110 See Sony, 464 US at 446.
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See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control

over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1616 (2001) ("[o]ne might
therefore conclude that when copyright and
new technology conflict the copyright owner's
right to control the disposition of the work must
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dissemination.
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L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (codified as
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U.S.C.).
See Eric Schlachter, The Intellectual Property
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the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113
HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999) (stating that content
subject to copyright can not be controlled on
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new ways to make money in cyberspace); John
Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: A Framework for Rethinking Patents and Copyrights in
the Digital Age, WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 85, available
at
http://www.eff.org/-barlow/
EconomyOfldeas.html (arguing that traditional
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digital medium).
See Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 512).
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119

See id. § 512(a)-(e).
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No Electronic Theft Act, amending the Copyright Act by removing the requirement that the
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may be able to rely on these measures to secure the distribution of and payment for their
works.").

See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying
text.
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See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Use and Ex-

cuse on the Internet, 24 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS
1, 42-43 (2000).
See Sony Corp of America v Universal City
Studios, Inc, 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
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See, e.g., Alfred C. Yen, supra note 48, at 1835
("The Internet lowers costs by replacing expensive 'real space' stores, copies, and communication with cheap, speedy, electronic equivalents.").
133

134 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The ConSee Motion Picture Association, U.S. Enter- gress shall have Power ... [t]o promote the
tainment Industry: 2002 MPA Market Statistics Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
(2002).
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
129 Id.
Notably, recent years saw a sharp de- and Discoveries.").
cline of video cassette businesses. This was
largely due to the growing penetration of DVDs 135 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 430 (quoting BENJAMIN
KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT, Forein households.
word, vii-viii (1967)); see also Stewart v. Abend,
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other ways for producers to recover their in- need for access to creative works."); Twentieth
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able at http://www.news.scotsman.com/
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(1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the
the music industry).
clause empowering Congress to grant patents
131 See RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180
and copyrights is the conviction that encourF.3d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 1999) ("[Tlhe Internet agement of individual effort by personal gain
also supports a burgeoning traffic in legitimate is the best way to advance public welfare").
audio computer files. Independent and wholly
Internet record labels routinely sell and provide 136 See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
free samples of their artists' work online, while 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948). Also, as indicated in
many unsigned artists distribute their own the legislative history of the U.S. Copyright Act,
material from their own websites. Some free "The enactment of copyright legislation by
samples are provided for marketing purposes Congress under the terms of the Constitution
or for simple exposure, while others are teasers is not based upon any natural right that the
intended to entice listeners to purchase either author has in his writings, ... but upon the
mail order recordings or recordings available ground that the welfare of the public will be
for direct download.").
served and progress of science and useful arts
will by promoted...." H.R, REP. No. 2222, 6 0 th
132 See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, supra note 113,
Cong., 2d Sess., at 7 (1909).
at 1619 ("The technological measures that reinforce legal control may enable and encour- 137 See generally Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright
age authorial entrepreneurship, because authors Law and Social Dialogue on the Information
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inexhaustible in that on person's use of information will not naturally diminish another's use
of the same. Therefore, the society would tend
to under-produce pubic goods, without additional incentives provided by legal institutions.
For an excellent treatment of economic theories in connection with intellectual property, see
generally James Boyle, A Theory of Law and In138 For a wide variety of ways that digital tech- formation: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and
nology may improve and enhance our lives, see Insider Trading, 80 CARLIF. L. REV. 1413, 1443RONALD H. BROWN & BRUCE A. LEHMAN, supra note 57 (1992).
27, at 7-10.
145 See generally Paul Goldstein, Copyright and
139 See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren, supra note 137,
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tion bottleneck in cyberspace); Alfred C. Yen, authors' rights and their impact on the tradisupra note 48, at 1870 (by drawing analogy tional copyright regime). In reality, some addifrom libel cases, explaining why overreaching tional enforcement products have been introcopyright liability will have a chilling effect on, duced, which will permit copyright holders to
and cause overaggressive enforcement by limit unauthorized use of their works on the
Internet. For example, Copyright.net has deInternet service providers ).
veloped a new software application called
140 See Timothy L. Skelton, Comment, Internet "Copyright Agent" that facilitates the notice and
Copyright Infringement and Service Providers: The take-down procedure mandated by the DMCA.
Case for a Negotiated Rulemaking Alternative,
35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 219, 302-03 (1998) (argu- 146 See Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248
ing that overbroad copyright liability on Internet U.S. 215, 263 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (1918)
service providers will pose a threat to afford- (stating that "Courts are ill-equipped to make
the investigations which should precede a deable information access).
termination of ... any property right in news.").
141 See Sony 464 U.S. at 429 (stating that copyright law "involves a difficult balance between 147 Notably, some commentators argue that even
the interests of authors.. .in the control and ex- legislation often results from expedient comploitation of their writings.. .on the one hand, promises between lobbying groups regardless
and society's competing interest in the free flow of social costs as a whole. See, e.g., Jessica
of ideas, information, and commerce on the Litman, Copyright, Compromise and Legislative
History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 869-79 (stating
other hand").
that the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976 was born
142 Id. at 431.
out to be a negotiated settlement among specific stakeholders).
143 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETI148 Arguably, the Sony doctrine has been narTION, § 38, cmt. b (1995).
rowed by the DMCA in the area of copyright144 Intellectual property, by contrast to tangible related circumvention technologies. The Copyproperty, has more characteristics of public right Act prohibits the manufacture an distrigoods, in which there is an inherent dilemma bution of products and services used to defeat
of production versus access. A public good is technological measures used to control access
usually described as "non-excludable" and "in- or to protect the rights of a copyright owner, if
exhaustible." It is non-excludable in that, once those product or services are primarily designed
information is published, it will physically be or produced for the purposes of circumventdifficult to exclude others from using it. It is ing technological measures, or have only limSuperhighway: the Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Operators, 13 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 345 (1995) (arguing that imposing copyright liability on BBS operators
would hinder the potential of digital technology to promote decentralized information communications and enhance social dialogue).
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420 U.S. 376 (1975) (holding that a medical journal publisher's photocopying is considered a fair
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